All states have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not.” All states have one, “but not all grand strategies are equal.”

“All states have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not.” All states have one, “but not all grand strategies are equal.” To last so long Eastern Rome had to modify its strategy as they “could not hope to subdue to annihilate all comers in the classic Roman manner.”

“The Byzantines had no central planning staffs to produce documents in the modern manner, including the recent innovation of formal statements of ‘national strategy’ that attempt to define ‘interests,’ the means to protect and enhance them, and the alignment of the two in rational or at least rationalized terms.” The closest thing I know of to a grand strategy are the military manuals, but they are not fully comprehensive enough to solely be a grand strategy.

Edward N. Luttwak listed these elements as their broadly generalized unofficial operational code, it is very well thought out:

I. “Avoid war by every possible means in all possible circumstances, but always act as if it might start at any time. Train both individual recruits and complete formations intensively, exercise units against each other, prepare weapons and supplies to be ready for battle at all times—but do not be eager to fight.
The highest purpose of maximum combat readiness is to increase the probability of not having to fight at all.”

II. “Gather intelligence on the enemy and his mentality, and monitor his movements continuously.”

III. “Campaign vigorously, both offensively and defensively, but attack mostly with small units; emphasize patrolling, raiding, and skirmishing rather than all-out attacks. Avoid battle, and especially large-scale battle, except in very favorable circumstances”

IV. “Replace the battle of attrition with the ‘nonbattle’ of maneuver. On the defensive, do not confront greatly superior forces; instead keep close to invading armies, remaining just beyond their reach, to quickly pounce on outnumbered detachments, baggage trains, and looting parties. Prepare ambushes large and small in the path of enemy forces, and lure them into ambushes by feigned retreats. On the offensive, mount raids or, better, probes that withdraw promptly if they encounter stiff resistance. Rely on constant activity, even if each action is small in scale, to demoralize and materially weaken the enemy over time.”

V. “Strive to end wars successfully by recruiting allies to change the over- all balance of power. Diplomacy is therefore even more important in war than at peace”

VI. “Subversion is the best path to victory. It is so cheap as compared to the costs and risks of battle that it must always be attempted, even with the most unpromising targets infused with hostility or religious ardor. When facing an imminent jihadi offensive, the strategos is advised to be- friend the emirs of the frontier castles, sending them ‘gift baskets.’ No exception was to be made for known fanatics: by the tenth century, the Byzantines had certainly discovered that religious fanatics can also be bribed, and indeed often more easily—they are creative in inventing religious justifications for taking bribes”

VII. “When diplomacy and subversion are not enough and there must be fighting, it should done with ‘relational’ operational methods and tactics that circumvent the most pronounced enemy strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses. To avoid consuming the major combat forces, it may be necessary to patiently whittle down the enemy’s moral and material strength. That may require much time. But there is no urgency because as soon as one enemy is no more, another will surely take his place for all is constantly changing as rulers and nations rise and fall. Only the empire is eternal.”

It is a very unique book on the Eastern Roman geopolitical world view.

Source - The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire by Edward N. Luttwak @ELuttwak